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ABSTRACT 
Side Channel Attack (SCA) differs from traditional mathematic attacks. It gets around of the exhaustive mathematic 
calculation and precisely pin to certain points in the cryptographic algorithm to reveal confidential information from the 
running crypto-devices. Since the introduction of SCA by Paul Kocher et al [1], it has been considered to be one of the 
most critical threats to the resource restricted but security demanding applications, such as wireless sensor networks. In 
this paper, we focus our work on the SCA-concerned security verification on WSN (wireless sensor network). A detailed 
setup of the platform and an analysis of the results of DPA (power attack) and EMA (electromagnetic attack) is 
presented. The setup follows the way of low-cost setup to make effective SCAs. Meanwhile, surveying the weaknesses 
of WSNs in resisting SCA attacks, especially for the EM attack. Finally, SCA-Prevention suggestions based on 
Differential Security Strategy for the FPGA hardware implementation in WSN will be given, helping to get an improved 
compromise between security and cost. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Side channel information, such as power consumption or electromagnetic leakage from a running electronic device are 
intrinsically data or process dependent. If these side-channel information could be properly gathered and analyzed by 
special methods, it's possibly to be used to retrieve secret data. Some are especially critical, such as the keys of 
cryptographic algorithms. 
SCA-specific researches have been successfully conducted towards many kind of crypto-algorithm implementation 
[5] [8]. The methods mainly include simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), correlation power 
analysis (CPA), electromagnetic analysis (EMA) and fault analysis (FA) [1][15][22]. 
SCA differs from traditional mathematic crypto-analysis. It doesn't need excellent mathematic background which is 
normally necessary when making mathematic analysis. In order to avoid these threats, countermeasures could be adopted 
towards specific scenarios, for instance, masking or hiding[9-12]. However, added security implies added costs. In the 
realistic scenarios of cost-driven WSN (wireless sensor networks), massive number of nodes always require low cost for 
each one, low energy consumption, long lifetime and easy maintenance. The inherent characteristic of resource-
constraints WSN make it not suitable for most SCA-security methods. 
In this paper, we mainly focus our work on the SCA-concerned security considerations on WSN. We present SCA attack 
to the FPGA implemented AES-128 cryptographic algorithm on our own wireless sensor node. We survey the low-cost 
oriented setup, and give detailed setup of the platform and analysis to the results of different PA and EMA attacks. 
The SCA-setup is based on CEI's WSN node-Cookie [13]. We adopt a broad range of special measures to make the setup 
low-cost. In a WSN scenario, unintentional EM leakage is more possible. We setup far-field attack environment, and 
successfully make 1-meters far-field EM attack. The details of the platforms will be given. The selection of EM antenna 
will also be introduced. SCA-Prevention suggestions of DSS (Differential Security Strategy) for the FPGA hardware 
implementation in WSN will be given, helping to make an optimal tradeoff between security and cost. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The basic knowledge of SCA will be explained in section 1, including side 
channel leakage sources, the power and EM attack model. In section 3, we analyze WSN's weakness to be attacked and 
fragility in resisting side channel attacks. EM leakage, which is more possible in WSN environment, will be stressed in 
large part. In section 4, we show the details of our testing platform of power attack and EM attacks respectively, 
including also far-field EM attack. The results of the attacks will be analyzed in section 5 and finally give the differential 
security strategy which aims to optimize the tradeoff between security and cost in WSNs. Section 6 shows the 
conclusions and future work. 
2. SIDE CHANNEL ATTACK FUNDAMENTALS 
In this section, we survey the source of side channel leakages, and show how they correlate with the data processed. 
2.1 Side channel sources 
Side channel attacks try to search and reveal the hidden connection between information and physical signals. The first 
time to predict the possibility of using electromagnetic leakage (EM) to make side channel attack is in [1]. Soon, the first 
solid EM side channel attack is done in [6]. Sound, fault, and timing are also studied [14-16]. In our work, we 
exclusively focus work on power and EM in WSN attacks. 
The basic processing element in current digital circuits is the bit. Large number of bits have essentially large number of 
value possibilities. The state changes for processing different data lead to different physical characteristics. For instance, 
the different actions of charging, discharging and keeping in each clock cycle consumes different amounts of power in 
CMOS circuits. SCA primarily explore this type of leakages. 
Normally, there are two types of power dissipation, static and dynamic power consumptions, comprising the total power 
dissipation in CMOS circuit. When the CMOS logic cell switches, the dynamic power dominant the total power 
consumption. Generally, dynamic power is comprised of charging current and short circuit current [3]. 
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Equation(l) is the description for the power consumption of charging the load capacitance of CMOS cells. Here, kchar , 
/ , CL, VDD respectively stand for the factor, clock frequency, load capacitance, and supply voltage. In equation(2), Ipeak 
means the peak short circuit current in each time short circuit occurs. tsc is the time short circuit current exists. Actually, 
it's not necessary to get deep known about the details. Only the fact that dynamic power consumption is several orders of 
magnitude larger than the static one is enough and power consumption for charging and discharging actions are in the 
same order of magnitude. In side channel attack, the work is not to make the detailed research of how power 
consumption occurs, but to explore a macro regulation which could be used in constructing the general side channel 
model. Here, we estimate the power consumption from charging and discharging equally as 1 unit. Since different 
actions lead to different power consumptions, in this estimation, the power consumption could be treated as dada-
dependent. Table 1 shows the simplified power model. 
Table 1. Power Estimation Model 
Actions 
Keeping 
Charging 
Discharging 
Keeping 
Previous 
Value 
0 
0 
1 
1 
Current 
Value 
0 
1 
0 
1 
Power 
Estimation 
(A) 
0 
1 
1 
0 
Power 
Estimation 
(B) 
0 
1.5 
1 
0 
One big merit of side channel attack is due to the easiness to construct the attack model. For instance, transition of 0->l 
always consumes more power that the transition of l->0. Therefore power consumption estimation of transition of 0->l 
could be set as 1.5 units, meanwhile, transition of l->0 set comparatively smaller as 1 unit. In different devices, the type 
of device, type of cells, parasitic parameters differ much. Further, in most of cases, attackers have just very little 
knowledge about the targeted device, how the algorithm is implemented. All these make the use of very precise and 
uniform model impractical. However, rough estimation, like we used above, could still be useful in most cases. That 
means, no matter on which device the algorithm is running, FPGA, ASIC, microprocessor or whatever, rough estimation 
is effective and practical in most attack scenarios. 
Generally, power consumption could be measured by means of directly detecting current in power supply or voltage drop 
of shunt resisters in the power supply wire. The detailed setup in our platform will be shown in section 4. 
Similarly to power, electromagnetic leakages from different actions are also data-dependent. According to Faraday's 
Law, the electric potential induced VSMis inversely proportional to the changing rate of magnetic flow. 
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Here, B is the strength of magnetic field and S is the area B penetrates. 
In Biot-Savart equation, / is the changing current which is correlated to the data processed. B is inversely proportional to 
the parameter r that represents the distance from the current to the place where the VEMis induced. That means, the closer 
the distance, the larger B is, and subsequently a larger absolute VSMcould be obtained. 
B=^- (5) 
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In the Electromagnetic test, self-made multi-turn coil antennas are used to pick up the magnetic radiation. Therefore, the 
antenna should be placed close to the cell which produced the EM signals so as to get better EM radiation. 
Since VEM is indirectly correlated to the current /, and / is data-dependent, therefore, VSMis also data-dependent. So, the 
same estimation as that used in Table 1 is valid as well. 
2.2 Power / EM model 
The 'Attack model' is the function used to predict the side channel signals. Hamming Weight (HW) and Hamming 
Distance (HD) models are the two models that are commonly used. In principle, HW model is to count the number of 
value "1" in digital circuits in one state S0, represented as HW(S0). HD model is to count the number of transitions ('"0" 
to "1" or "1" to "0") before and after a clock edge, therefore it involves two consecutive states S0 and 51 ; represented as 
HD(S0,S1)=HW(S0 © Sx). Each model matches different situations. 
For instance, for a group of 4 bits in 2 clock cycles, let's assume the previous state S0= 0101, and next state is Sx= 1100. 
The term Snx refers to the xthbit in clock cycle n. So, fromS0 to 51 ; 2 bits are changed, I .e . '->o.4->',-*1.4 
("0"V'l"), s0A -» 
S1A ("1"V0"). Therefore, HD(S0,S1)=HW(S0 © S1)=HW(0101©1100)=2. The value of 2 is the predicted power 
consumption from the HD model. In order to use HD model, two assumptions should be matched, changes from 0->l and 
1 ->0 contribute the same amount of power consumption. These are just the requirements from the estimations in Table 1. 
That's why HD could be used to reveal the hidden data-dependence. In some cases, the knowledge about the algorithm is 
too limited that the consecutive value of bits are not known. In these situations, HW model is the only option. HW model 
assumes the value of bits in either side is constant (all 0, all 1, or any fixed value). 
2.3 Attack method 
The idea of this attack is simple [3]. We guess all possible keys, and using these keys to predict the power or EM 
leakages. Then, we compare them with the real measured power or EM traces. Using correlation coefficients equation (6) 
to find one hypothetic group of side channel trace. For the one which matches the most, the corresponding key is the 
right key. Each attack round will find one byte (8 bits) of the total 128 bits key for AES-128. Therefore, 16 attack rounds 
could find the complete key. We emphasize that the same group of power or EM traces is used for different key byte's 
attacks. 
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Since calculations depend on the correlation calculation, the more samples we have, the better the analysis results is 
likely to be. Therefore, in side channel attack, a large number of samples (power or EM traces) is needed. In our attack, 
we normally use 30,000 traces in power analysis and 10,000 in EM traces. 
3. WEAKNESSES IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
In this part, a brief security discussion is shown, which includes the WSN concerned threats and related protection 
mechanisms. Our test platform - Cookies WSN node is also detailed in this section. 
3.1 Security issues in WSN 
A wide range of applications for wireless sensor networks show much interest to attackers, especially in security 
sensitive areas, like military, financial and high-tech researches. One major characteristic for WSN is that the nodes in 
WSN are typically unattended. This provides more conveniences to the attacker to perform sophisticated attacks. 
/. Threats to wireless networks 
Threats to wireless networks can be classified into two categories. The first is physical attacks. In this kind of attack, 
attacker simply aims to physically destroy certain nodes in order to ruin parts or paralyze the whole networks. To prevent 
this attack, it seems there is no better solution than fortifying the nodes with hard protective case. However, this 
countermeasure more or less brings bad effect to the normal function of nodes. 
Fortunately, in majority of case, attacker prefers more meaningful work towards WSNs, not just to physically damage 
them. These are non-physical attacks in which the attacker performs sophisticated work that could be categorized as 
invasive and non-invasive attacks [4]. 
A. invasive attack In this kind of attack, the attacker aims to bring soft errors to make the networks malfunction so as to 
paralyze the networks or to rob secrets. For instance, they implant malicious code to the node to: 1) Masquerade as the 
controller of this network to control other nodes; 2) modify the routing information to lead the confidential information 
to dummy nodes or black hole nodes; 3) Simply generate a lot of junk information to make traffic jam in communication 
channels. 
B. non-invasive attack The difference between this attack and the previous one is that, it leaves very little or even no 
traces in the targeted networks during and after the attacks. That means, during the whole process of the attack, 
everything in the networks works normally. The task for non-invasive attacker is simply to steal secrets like keys of 
cryptographic protocols. After a successful attack, everything in this network is transparent to this attacker if the network 
users have no clues about it. Side channel attack is one of this kind of attack. 
II. Defenses 
Defense countermeasures are adopted to ensure the authentication, integrity and confidentiality of the information 
collected, processed and transmitted in WSN [17]. In order to elaborate these countermeasures clearly, we separate them 
into two major types, active and reactive. 
A. Active protection mechanism In the type of active countermeasures, security protections are always existing and 
running. That means, no matter whenever the danger occurs, active counter actions could respond immediately. No 
trigger, no setup time is needed. If a network is protected by active protection mechanism, it's always in defense status. 
This type includes the existing / non-changeable hardware protection made on the level of circuit structure or non-
reconfigurable protection protocols on networks. 
B. Reactive protection mechanism Similar to the stress-reaction of animals, this type of protection needs the external 
trigger to activate the protections. In the safe situation, protection mechanism is in the state of hibernation. Once threats 
are detected or system enters into the state of security sensitive state, protection mechanism is activated in order to offer 
security protections. Reactive protection mechanism includes reconfigurable hardware modification and convertible 
network security protocol changes. 
III. Comparisons 
Compared with active mechanism, reactive protection greatly reduce the resource usage. In the safe situation, hibernation 
of protection system only consumes little resources, which consequently render other functions have more resources to 
use, such as more chip area, longer battery lifetime and bigger computing capabilities. However, this needs more 
complicated activation control system for the protection mechanism. It also risks missing threats if alarm trigger fails in 
certain situation. 
It should be noticed that the security of any protection is relative. That means, no protection could obtain infinite security 
assurance. Security depends on the threat types, attack methods, time and attack efforts. For instance, a normal dual rail 
logic [2] protected circuit is strong in resisting power attack however it's weak in resisting EM attack. Most SCA-
resistant protections gradually become weaker when attacker spends long time to analyze much larger number of side 
channel traces. Therefore, it's suggestive to combine different protections together to obtain a high security assurance, 
such as using periodically changing key to counter dedicated long time attacks. 
IV. Constraints in WSN 
Full and high security protections are highly required during the WSN designing. The key factor that limits the security 
measures is the feature of resource deficiency. WSNs are always constrained in terms of battery, memory, computing 
capability and data transmitting rate due to the miniaturized node size. The tasks of processing and transmitting data 
always consume most energy and hardware resources in WSN, especially in the application area of multi-media 
monitoring. So, the security strategy with high efficiency in resource-scarce environment becomes mandatory. Simply 
increasing the node size cannot be feasible since the total cost becomes a critical factor when massively deploy the WSN 
nodes. 
3.2 Cookie WSN node 
Most of our tests run on the platforms which are based on Cookie WSN node [13]. Cookie is developed by Centro de 
Electrónica Industrial, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, focusing on the wide requirements for WSN node with 
modularity, which makes the node easy to be deployed in a wide range of applications. Cookies are composed of four 
layers (more layers could be added depending on various requirements in different applications) as shown in figure 1. 
The four layers are: power layer, communication layer, processing layer and sensor layer, each one carries out their 
specific functions. 
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Figure 1. Cookie WSN node 
These layers are detailed as follows: 
1. Communication layer: The last version of this layer includes a ZigBee module (ETRX2 from Telegesis). This 
module is controlled by the uC through the UART port. 
2. Power layer: This layer generates all the voltages needed within the Cookie. Two versions have been developed, 
the latest with USB included, which allows power supply from a PC and serial programming for the uC 
3. Processing layer: It's the core part of Cookie node. It includes an 8052 uC from Analog Devices (ADuC841) and 
a Xilinx XC3S200 Spartan 3 FPGA. The uC and the FPGA share three 8-bit ports for communication. 
4. Sensor layer: This layer includes those elements which are intended to take measures from the environment. Up 
to now, several different layers have been developed for the Cookie. These layers include sensors of acceleration, 
temperature, humidity, light, infrared, PH value and strain of deformation. 
Our SCA platform focus on the processing and power layers. In processing layer's Spartan 3 FPGA, AES-128 is running. 
We made necessary modifications to power layer for power attack setup, including removing the decoupling capacitor, 
inserting shunt resister and adding extra capacitor to stabilize the power supply. In EM setup, no changes are needed. 
4. POWER / EM ATTACK PLATFORM 
The detailed setups of power and EM tests are shown in this part. 
4.1 Brief Introduction to AES 
We choose AES [7] in our experiments due to its wide utilization in security applications nowadays. The name of AES is 
the acronym for Advanced Encryption Standard which was chosen as one of the candidates for the substitution of old 
DES (Data Encryption Standard) in US National Institute of Standards and Technology. It was finally ratified as the 
federal standard in 2002. 
AES is the most recent encryption algorithm approved by US federal. According to modern security definition for 
cryptographic algorithm, the high security assurance of AES is due to the fulfillment of 2 criterions: first, there is no 
backdoor in the algorithm to be used to break it, i.e. brute force attack is the only way to find the key of this algorithm. 
Up to now, no backdoor of AES is found or reported in the literature. Second, depending on the current computing 
power in the world, breaking the algorithm by brute force is not possible within a acceptable scale of time. 
AES is a symmetric cryptographic algorithm. The commonly used key size are 128 bit, 192 bits, and 256 bits. The key 
and data in AES are processed in block of 128 bits (state). Every state block is divided into 16 sub-blocks of 8 bits each. 
The complete process involves the cyclic executions of 4 types of operations: SubByte, ShiftRow, MixColumn and 
AddRoundKey [7]. The number of iterations for AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 are respectively 11, 13, 15. All 
rounds have all 4 types of operations except for the last round that misses the operation of mix column, as shown in 
figure 2. 
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Figure 2. AES Cryptographic Algorithm 
AES-128 algorithm [18] in Xilinx Spartan 3 FPGA is implemented in testing platform. We choose the output of the Sbox 
in the last (11th) AES round as the attack point. For the convenience of the far-field check, an simplified AES is 
compiled for EM attack. In the simple AES, key and data size are compressed to 8 bits in which only the operations of 
add round key and sub bytes exist. 
4.2 Setup of power consumption attack 
Depending on CEI's Cookie WSN node, we setup our SCA testing platform. Setups for both power and EM attack will 
be shown in this section. 
Figure 3. AES Cryptographic Algorithm 
Figure 3 is the illustration of power consumption setup. In order to test power consumption of the node, a shunt resistor 
is inserted into the power supply VDD (small picture in Figure 4). The voltage drop across the resistor is measured and 
amplified by an analog amplifier, the amplifier is necessary if differential voltage probe is not available in measuring the 
voltage drop of shunt resister in VDD but not GND. An Agilent oscilloscope is used to repeatedly collect and transfer 
power traces into the Matlab workspace running on PC. There is no specific rule to choose this kind of trigger. It should 
be pointed out that the trigger signal is used in our setups in order to repeatedly trigger the oscilloscope to collect and 
transfer power or EM traces. Actually, in realistic scenarios, there are normally no such existing trigger to be used. 
Typically, the attacker have to try to find a substitution signal or collect a single and very long trace, and then precisely 
partition it by some skills [3][19]. We emphasize that it's possible. But it's not a critical issue in our work, so we 
intentionally generate the trigger signal so as to make our tests easier to be implemented. In real situations, any kind of 
signal that demonstrates the beginning or ending of the algorithm could be adopted. If no trigger signal is available, 
alignment method could also be used [19]. 
Figure 4. Platform of Power Attack on Cookie WSN node 
Actually, power measure is a kind of contacting attack, which render it not so optimal in reality. In the modern WSN 
application, warning system could be activated in case of any unexpected trigger action. 
4.3 Setup of EM attack 
The electromagnetic attack is a kind of silent, contactless attack. The EM setup is generally simpler than that of power 
consumption attack. EM collecting equipment just need to be deployed in certain position near the running cryptographic 
device, no need to search for the power supply wire, to insert the resistor, to remove decoupling capacitors or to connect 
the voltage or current probes to the device. In this paper, we first show the near-field EM attack, which is the commonly 
studied type of EM attack. In principle, far distance attacks allow the attacker to circumvent WSN security protections. 
Here, we also show the far-field EM setup on which the EM attack could be successfully implemented, with distances of 
1 meter, or even further. It should be noticed that the magnetic signal here is not the wireless signal from the 
communication level. 
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Figure 5. EM attack platform 
The designed EM probe is a self-made multi-turn coil antenna [20]. The design parameters are: copper wire diameter: 
0.4mm; antenna diameter: 4mm; antenna turns: 25. We checked many antenna types, and this one had the best 
performance for the close-field attack in our platform. According to equation (5), parameter r should be as small as 
possible in order to get stronger EM field. A easier result may suggest to decapsulate the chip in order to deploy the 
antenna in extremely close position. However, such deliberate preparation is not preferable in real situation, even not 
easy in a well-equipped laboratory. Not to mention that this operation makes the contactless non-invasive attack become 
an contacting invasive attack. 
7. Close-Field EM Setup EM side channel information collected is normally concentrated to a small area around the 
CMOS cell targeted. That's because we set the antenna precisely to the targeted cell. The EM strength from this cell in 
this position is much stronger than EM field from other cells. Consequently, the interesting EM radiation counts for a 
larger part of total. That's why if the EM setup is proper, less measured traces are needed to break the key. As we 
mentioned before, in majority of cases, it's not easy to search and place the antenna to such a precise position. We retreat 
to the idea of making power attack, setting the antenna to a close place to the power supply pins or, depending on the 
attack type, to the output pins of AES algorithm of the chip. It's easier than making a laborious surface scanning to find 
the position above the tiny targeted registers. Figure 6 shows the EM platform for the close-field attack. 
Figure 6. Platform of EM close-field attack on Cookie WSN node 
II. Far-Field EM Setup In real application of WSNs, the non-invasive attack to the unattended node from a far distance 
produces more serious security threats than invasive and close field attack. If it's a successful far-field attack, no trace 
will be left. Consequently he WSN security mechanism will not be triggered. The Stress-Reaction security strategy will 
absolutely fail. Therefore, such an attack is the major security threat in the resource-deficient WSN environment. Figure 
7 is the setup of our far-field EM attack. The difference here is that we strengthened the EM field by connect the 
ciphertext output pins of AES-128 to external wires. By this means, output EM field is strengthened and could be 
detected by self-made EM antenna from a far distance. In our setup, we test it in a distance of 1 meter away with a bigger 
antenna. According to equation (4), bigger antenna has a larger area B , it helps to increase the magnetic flux and 
subsequently increase the induced voltage VEM. 
Figure 7. Platform of EM far-field attack on Cookie WSN node 
5. ATTACK RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Both power and EM attacks to WSN node are successful. A detailed result analysis is give in this sections. The possible 
SCA leakage ways are summarized which should be noticed in the designing for security-concerned WSNs. Primitive 
idea of strategy security strategy is also discussed. 
5.1 Result analysis 
Power Attack As we mentioned before, the last round of AES encryption is targeted. The algorithm run repeatedly 1000 
times. Depending on Segmented memory, 1000 traces are gathered and then transferred to the PC in each collection time 
for the side channel analysis. The sampling rate of the oscilloscope is set at 35.1MSa/s. The working frequency of the 
WSN node is 86.4KHz. Typically, the power variation (voltage) that contains the meaningful information is smaller than 
2mV, which is also the normal minimum vertical resolution of oscilloscope. We have to use an amplifier to make such 
small variation bigger if an active probe is not available. For the amplifier AD623 A, when the gain is in the range from 
10-100, bandwidth is from 100-10 KHz. In our test, we set gain at 30, so we have to slow down the working frequency to 
a low level 86.4KHz in order to ensure sufficient distinction of power variations. 
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Figure 8. 11 peaks represent the 11 iterations in AES-128, the last peak is the attack round in our test. 
Figure 8 shows the power trace collected from the target node. The number of power traces used in each analysis is 
30,000. The success rate of getting the right key increases when the number of power traces is increased. This could be 
clearly seen from Figure 10. This is the correlation trend following the increasing number of power traces. We see that 
since approximate 5,200 power traces, the correlation traces representing the right key can be differentiated from other 
keys' correlation traces. That means, the more traces we used in the statistical analysis, the more possibilities to reveal 
the hidden connection. Normally, we get most of the 16 final round key bytes successfully under 30,000 power traces. 
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Figure 9. Only the correlation trace representing the right key has a very high peak. 
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Figure 10. Right key emerges following the increasing number of the analyzed power traces. 
EM Attack EM attack typically leads to better results than power attack. Since there is no such rigorous limitation for 
the bandwidth as in power attack, we set the working frequency of the target to the highest frequency of Cookie node, 
11.0592MHz. Here, we use a simplified AES algorithm just for the convenience to connect the outputs to the on-board 
pins. Firgure 11 illustrates the simplified AES. Here, key and plaintexts are all 8 bits (the basic calculation block in 
complete AES algorithm). They are processed by bitxor operation and then substituted by AES Sbox to get the 8 bit 
plaintext. As well, we use all possible key (8 key bits for 256 possibilities) and known plaintext to predict the output of 
plaintexts, and then use the estimated EM model to transfer them into EM traces. Finally we compare them with the real 
measured EM traces. Similarly, the one that matches most with the real measure traces represents the right key. 
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Figure 11. Simplified AES module 
The EM trace is illustrated in Figure 12, This peak is caused by the transition of the output register. Since it is induced 
EM trace, the duration time for it is extremely short, typically less than 10 ns. That's why we could use EM way to attack 
the algorithm running on a very high clock frequency. However, we must ensure that the oscilloscope could run at a 
sufficiently high sampling rate. The height of these peaks is related to the changing of the current in the output register. 
This is just the meaningful information SCA explores. 
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Figure 12. EM trace for the register transition 
If the transition peak could be successfully sampled, by using the right analysis, results with high correlation peak could 
be obtained, as shown in figure 13 and 14. This is due to the characteristics explained in section 4.3. First, the EM trace 
is very specific to the target actions, not as power trace that contains the information from all the actions in the whole 
circuits. Second, the fast EM changes avoids much EM noise from the other actions, not likely to be covered by previous 
action's effects. 
Figure 13. Higher correlation peak means guessed and measured traces are closely matched. 
Figure 14. Compared with power attack, EM attack need much smaller number of traces to reveal the right key. 
In previous papers, EM attack tests primarily focus on the CMOS cell which produces the interesting EM emanations. 
Therefore, attackers need to very carefully set the antenna to very precise position, even need to decapsulate the chip 
package in order to locate the minor targeted cell. Obviously, these deliberate measures reduce the practicability in 
realistic scenarios. According to the results of our tests, there are at least the following several sources leaking EM 
characteristics that could be used to make successful EM attacks. 
1. The normally studied EM source directly from the targeted CMOS registers. 
2. As the setup in figure 6, the onboard pins that connect with the proper outputs of the cryptographic algorithm. 
3. The solder ball on the flip-chip B GA package that connect to the proper algorithm outputs, shown in figure 15 [21]. 
4. The decoupling capacitor that is used to stabilize the power supply for the chip. We emphasize that in power attack 
the decoupling capacitors tamper the power SCA. Therefore before the execution of power attack, decoupling 
capacitors are always removed. However, in EM attack, the fast-response decoupling capacitors could be used as 
the EM emanation source. 
5. In some cases, the outputs, i.e. the ciphertexts, need to be transferred to other device. If they are transferred through 
wires, far-distance EM attack may be successful due to the strong EM leakage from these wires. Depending on a 
bigger EM multi-turn copper coil antenna, we get successful EM attack at more than 1 meter away from the 
targeted WSN node. 
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Figure 15. Proper solder balls in the bottom of board leaks EM characteristics. 
5.2 Differential security strategy 
In WSNs, higher computing, transmitting, processing capabilities are demanded to meet the high performance needs. In 
order to control the total costs, only mean security measures are adopted for the protections against all sorts of threats. 
This will or have already imposed critical problems for the security issues in WSNs. Security is always a tradeoff 
between cost and requirements, but this is particularly true in the WSN applications. Constraints in resource-scare 
environment, like WSN, greatly limits the freedom to choose the security measures. DSS (Differential Security Strategy) 
is provided here which aims to find a way to get best match between security and cost. 
In a different scenarios, security levels required are different, even in the same WSN, from one node to another. For 
instance, battlefield monitoring WSN has much higher security needs than security required in PH value detecting 
networks in a coffee factory. The aggregator node of the WSN in bank systems has more strict security level than the 
normal payment terminals in the same system. Uniform countermeasures against attack is not suitable to different 
applications considering the budget because of the mass and diverse applications. The core idea of DSS is classifying 
and quantizing the security requirements for each node and cost for each measure, and then use mathematical model to 
find the optimal tradeoff between cost and requirement. We still focus on the threats from side channel attacks and give a 
simple example as follows. 
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Figure 16. Partition of nodes in WSN 
In the WSN network shown in figure 16, three node types are deployed. Slave nodes are responsible for data acquisition. 
This kind of node is massively deployed and has lower security requirements. Aggregators relay and pre-process the data 
collected from the slave nodes, they are deployed in a smaller number. They are prone to be attacked since they are the 
pivots for information transmission. The master node is the final control node which summarizes data, sends orders and 
controls network states, only one master node is deployed in most cases. In DSS, different security protections are 
adopted in different nodes. For the slave node, only the information collected around each oneself is transmitted in these 
nodes, it's not so attractive as the aggregator which replays information from a large number of slave nodes. Therefore, 
Basic security measures that consume low energy, occupy small chip area and low computing power could be adopted. 
For aggregators, they are more attractive targets. Medium protections are suitable. Since the number for these nodes are 
not great, more expensive hardware resources could be configured in order to meet the medium security requirement. For 
the master node, it's the most valuable node for the attackers since it contains all information in this WSN. Normally, 
there is just one of this kind of node in a WSN system. We suggest to configure rich hardware resource so as to employ 
sophisticated and full protection to it. Quantizing security needs, resource available and costs are possibly to use the 
mathematical model to calculate the optimal matching point for these different parameters and finally find the best 
tradeoff between cost and security. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
We implemented the cryptographic algorithm AES-128 on a WSN node - Cookie, and give the details of our low-cost, 
but effective power and EM SCA platforms to this WSN node. We surveyed and categorized the threats of modern 
WSNs, and analyzed the weakness of WSN facing side channel threats, particularly for threats from EM attacks. 
According to the testing results, we get the merits and demerits of power and EM attack against WSN nodes. Also, the 
different sources of EM radiation are presented and successful EM attacks results are obtained respectively depending on 
these different leakage sources. This shows that a wide range of security weaknesses exist on WSN nodes in resisting 
EM attacks. We also analyze the conditions to execute the far-field EM attacks which impose special security concerns 
to WSN nodes. Finally, the idea of differential security strategy is shown aiming to get an optimal balance between cost 
and security requirements. 
Future work will focus on the countermeasures against WSN specific power and EM attacks. We depends on the dual-
rail [11-12] logic to implement the EM-resistant countermeasures in order to accustom it to the resource-deficient WSN 
environment. On the other hand, we will try to find suitable mathematical models to properly describe the quantized 
security and cost factors in differential security strategy suitable for WSNs. 
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